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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Although child pornography is not a new phenomenon, the Internet has given it 
new life.1 Throughout most of the twentieth century, law enforcement agencies have 
had considerable success in thwarting the trafficking of hard copy forms of child 
pornography.2 With the introduction of the Internet, however, the scale, reach, and 
nature of child pornography has dramatically changed.3 The Internet has escalated 
the problem of child pornography by allowing convenient, anonymous, and 
inexpensive access to a vast quantity of pornographic images from around the globe.4 
Further, the Internet facilitates peer-to-peer communication and provides a variety 
of formats, including pictures, videos, sound, and real-time interactive experiences, 
which have even allowed for live broadcasts of children being sexually abused.5 
Essentially, the Internet has created an international playground for those who 
produce, purchase, and distribute child pornography.6 Greater access to child 
pornography has created a greater demand and, in turn, a booming industry at the 
expense of innocent children.7
 The growing Internet market for child pornography has led to a multi-faceted 
response to the mere possession of child pornography.8 State and federal legislation 
has criminalized this conduct and possessors of child pornography have been actively 
prosecuted for their role in this unfortunate business.9 Recently, victims of child 
pornography have taken a new stand against the possessors of their images by 
1. See Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Child Pornography on 
the Internet 5 (2012).
2. See id.
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. at 11–12.
6. See Adam D. Lewis, Dollars and Sense: Restitution Orders for Possession of Child Pornography Under 18 
U.S.C. § 2259, 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 413, 415 (2011) (“The internet has also 
allowed child predators to network, more easily groom potential victims, cyber-stalk, contact child 
prostitutes, and engage in child trafficking.”). 
7. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 773 (5th Cir. 2012) (“By possessing, receiving, and distributing 
child pornography, defendants collectively create the demand that fuels the creation of the abusive 
images.”); Lewis, supra note 6, at 415 (“Even with state and federal law enforcement targeting child 
pornographers, approximately 20,000 new images of child pornography are uploaded to the internet 
each week. As such, child pornography remains a multi-billion dollar market.”).
8. See Lewis, supra note 6, at 423 (“Congress continues to funnel resources to federal and state law 
enforcement . . . [while] [t]he Supreme Court recognized that only the elimination of child pornography 
networks can truly rid society of child pornography.”).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting the receipt and possession of child pornography); Ohio v. 
Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding an Ohio criminal statute prohibiting the mere possession of 
child pornography because of the gravity of the state’s interests). The U.S. Department of Justice 
established the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section within its Criminal Division to handle crimes 
relating to the sexual exploitation of children, including the possession of child pornography. See Child 
Exploitation and Obscenity Section Mission, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
ceos/mission/mission.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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requesting restitution.10 Victims of child pornography can suffer psychological and 
emotional harm each time an image of their abuse is viewed.11 Restitution allows a 
victim to request a court to order a defendant to pay the victim, as part of the 
defendant’s criminal sentence, for the extent of the victim’s losses.12 Therefore, as a 
part of sentencing proceedings, victims who experience this harm are now requesting 
defendants reimburse them for the harm caused by the mere viewing and possessing 
of their images.13
 While “[i]t has long been uncontroversial to order restitution when the defendant 
is convicted of actual physical abuse of a child or of producing images constituting 
child pornography,”14 ordering restitution from these “end-users”15 of child 
pornography has provoked debate.16 The main issue involves the abstract, and at 
times controversial, notion that simply possessing images can cause a victim harm; to 
some, the connection often feels too attenuated to justify the liability assigned 
through criminal restitution.17 Apart from this debate, this note contends that there 
are additional problems in the current restitution framework that demonstrate why it 
is wrongly applied in possession cases. Particularly, restitution is inconsistently 
10. E.g., John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution at a Price Set by the Victim, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 3, 2010, at A19.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
The simple fact that the images have been disseminated perpetuates the abuse initiated 
by the producer of the materials. Consumers such as [defendant] who “merely” or 
“passively” receive or possess child pornography directly contribute to this continuing 
victimization. Having paid others to “act out” for him, the victims are no less damaged 
for his having remained safely at home[.]
 Id.; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (“The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims 
continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 
1260 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that individuals depicted in images of child pornography experience “the 
emotional and psychic pain of knowing that the images are being viewed”).
12. See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 932 
(1984) (“A restitution order requires the criminal offender to pay money or to render services to his 
victim in order to redress the loss he has inf licted.”); United States v. Cohen, 459 F.3d 490, 496 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that restitution is penal in nature and part of a defendant’s sentence).
13. Lewis, supra note 6, at 413 (“Victims have begun seeking compensation from anyone in possession of 
the images, not just the person responsible for producing the pornography.”).
14. United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D. Me. 2009).
15. “End-users” are those who merely possess and collect child pornography and benefit from the images 
produced and distributed by others; but they are not themselves involved in production or distribution. 
16. See Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (“A review of the cases decided thus far shows that victims’ success in 
obtaining restitution has varied significantly in district courts across the country.”); infra note 73 and 
accompanying text.
17. See Schwartz, supra note 10 (highlighting a George Washington University Law professor’s argument 
that the application of restitution in this context “stretches personal accountability to the breaking 
point”); Dina McLeod, Section 2259 Restitution Claims and Child Pornography Possession, 109 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1327, 1330 (2011) (explaining that the hesitancy of some judges to award restitution in possession 
cases is based on questions about the casual link between the victim’s harm and the defendant’s conduct 
and whether that link is too tenuous).
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administered, results in both disproportionate punishments and liability, and fails to 
adequately meet victims’ needs. In response, this note proposes that, instead of 
relying on courts to order restitution in possession cases, Congress should establish a 
victim compensation fund that would uniformly reimburse victims for the harm 
caused by possessors.
 Part II of this note will survey the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing 
not only the production and distribution of child pornography, but also the mere 
possession of child pornography. This section will also provide an overview of the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which governs the application of 
restitution to the crime of child pornography possession. Part III will then offer a brief 
investigation into the major problems caused by applying the current restitution 
framework to possession cases. First, courts have split on the application of the MVRA 
to the crime of possession, which has created inconsistencies that are detrimental to 
both defendants and victims.18 Second, restitution amounts can be disproportionate to 
the offense, which risks violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
excessive fines and minimizes the liability placed on producers.19 Finally, the current 
framework does not adequately meet the needs of victims;20 specifically, they are left 
unsatisfied with unpaid restitution orders and revictimized through offender 
notifications.21 Still other victims, who are not identified until after the defendant’s 
conviction, are unable to petition for restitution from that defendant at all.22
 In light of these problems, Part IV will explain this note’s proposal for 
congressional action. Specifically, Congress should remove the crime of child 
pornography possession from the scope of the MVRA, which would prohibit courts 
18. See Robert William Jacques, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution Framework for Child 
Pornography Victims, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1167, 1173, 1181–82 (2011) (arguing that the split among courts on 
the interpretation of the MVRA calls for congressional action).
19. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334, 1344.
20. See Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
of 1996, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1687, 1689–90 (2009) (arguing against the MVRA framework and proving 
guidance for a return to restorative justice).
21. Victims are notified each time another individual has been arrested for possessing their image. This is 
accomplished through the Victim Notification System (VNS), which is authorized under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3771 (West 2009). VNS is a network of federal law enforcement agencies that provides victims with 
information about any case that involves them. The Department of Justice Victim Notification System, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, https://www.notify.usdoj.gov/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
VNS is a cooperative effort between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), the United States Attorneys’ offices, 
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). This free, computer-based system provides 
important information to victims. In many cases you will receive letters generated 
through VNS containing information about the events pertaining to your case and/or 
any defendants in the case.
 Id.; see also United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (focusing on a 
victim’s painful reaction to offender notifications).
22. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194 (finding that the Internet’s anonymity makes identifying victims more 
difficult).
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from ordering restitution from possessors.23 However, victims should not be deprived 
of the opportunity for adequate compensation. Therefore, Congress should establish 
a federal victim compensation system, where a defendant, as part of his sentence, 
would pay into a special fund instead of directly paying the victim.24 The funds 
would then be dispersed to eligible victims of child pornography.25 Congress should 
adopt a model based on the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement 
Fund (ITVERP), which provides compensation to victims of international 
terrorism.26 A compensation program modeled after ITVERP would solve the 
problems associated with the current restitution model, as applied to the crime of 
possession, by providing a uniform approach that would create consistency for both 
victims and offenders, avoid disproportionate punishments and liability for end-
users, and, overall, better satisfy victims’ needs.
ii.  thE intErpLaY bEtWEEn pOssEssiOn Of ChiLd pOrnOgraphY and 
rEstitUtiOn
 A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Prohibiting Possession of Child Pornography
 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have addressed the issue of child 
pornography as it has grown and developed.27 Rooted in the notion that “[a] 
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth 
of young people into full maturity as citizens,”28 the Court has permitted state 
legislatures and Congress to place more and more restraints on production, 
distribution, and, finally, possession.29 In 1982, the year of the seminal Supreme 
Court case New York v. Ferber, the vast majority of states and Congress had passed 
statues prohibiting the production and distribution of child pornography.30 
Recognizing the extensive state legislative findings and acknowledging psychological 
research that focused on penalizing distribution as the most effective way to combat 
the problem,31 the Court in Ferber held that child pornography was outside the 
protection of the First Amendment and upheld a New York statute that prohibited a 
23. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342–45 (explaining the serious policy concerns associated with holding 
possessors liable under § 2259).
24. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (suggesting a statutory 
provision requiring fines for child pornography be paid into a victim compensation fund), vacated, In re 
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).
25. See Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793 n.12.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10603c (West 2008).
27. See Lewis, supra note 6, at 416.
28. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
29. Id. at 760; Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 103 (1990).
30. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749. By 1982, forty-seven states had outlawed the production and distribution of 
child pornography. Id.
31. Id. at 758 n.9, 760.
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person from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children by disseminating 
materials depicting these performances.32
 In Ferber, the Court acknowledged the grave consequences of the child 
pornography industry and declared that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”33 In 
upholding the the New York statute, the Court found these pornographic materials 
“bear[] so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production 
. . . that it is permissible to consider these materials without the protection of the 
First Amendment.”34 Further, the Court suggested a solution: “[t]he most expeditious 
if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for 
this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or 
otherwise promoting the product.”35
 Less than ten years later, in 1990, nineteen states had statutes prohibiting simple 
possession, the first of which was enacted in 1987—a short time after the birth of 
the Internet.36 Accordingly, in its Ohio v. Osborne decision, the Court furthered this 
trend of state legislatures and upheld an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession 
child pornography.37 The Court explained:
Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child 
pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all 
levels in the distribution chain. According to the State, since the time of our 
decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven 
underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child 
pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution.38
32. Id. at 774. The relevant part of the New York statute is as follows:
A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual performance if knowing the character 
and content thereof he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than sixteen years of 
age to engage in a sexual performance or being a parent, legal guardian or custodian of 
such a child, he consents to the participation by such child in a sexual performance.
 N.Y. Penal Law § 263.05 (McKinney 1980).
33. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
34. Id. at 764. More specifically, the Court in Ferber found child pornography was unprotected under the 
First Amendment regardless of whether the materials were “obscene,” which is a separate area of 
unprotected speech. Id. at 755–57.
35. Id. at 760.
36. Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 n.6 (1990).
37. Id. at 103.
38. Id. at 110 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). The relevant part of the Ohio statute 
is as follows:
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
. . .
(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the 
person’s child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:
(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, 
brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, 
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The Court also identified an additional interest in upholding the Ohio law, stressing 
that child pornography is a permanent record of a victim’s abuse that “causes the 
child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”39 The 
state’s ban on mere possession, therefore, would motivate possessors to destroy the 
materials, which, in time, would help to end the cycle of distribution and, in turn, 
end a victim’s continuing harm.40 In the end, by depriving the possession of child 
pornography of any constitutional protection, the Court approved the climate of 
intolerance created by state legislatures.41
 B. Congress’s Introduction of the Criminal Restitution Framework
 Beginning in the late 1970s, a victims’ rights movement had emerged, arguing 
that the criminal justice system had become overly offender-focused and lacked 
sensitivity to victim needs.42 In response to the movement and rising crime rates, 
President Ronald Reagan commissioned the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which 
conducted studies and made policy suggestions to improve the position of victims in 
the criminal justice system.43 A central focus of the task force and movement was the 
importance of a victim’s right to receive restitution from their perpetrator.44 Shortly 
thereafter, in 1982, Congress introduced restitution into the federal sentencing 
guidelines with the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA).45
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper 
purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person 
pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, member of the clergy, prosecutor, 
judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.
(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing 
to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in 
which the material or performance is used or transferred.
 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.323 (West 2012).
39. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1687; see Katherine Giblin, Click, Download, Causation: A Call for Uniformity 
and Fairness in Awarding Restitution to Those Victimized by Possessors of Child Pornography, 60 Cath. U. 
L. Rev. 1109, 1115 (2011) (suggesting the existence of proximate cause between possession and victim 
injuries and proposing congressional action to set monetary boundaries for judges in setting restitution 
amounts).
43. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime: Final Report (1982) 
[hereinafter President’s Task Force].
44. Giblin, supra note 42, at 1116; President’s Task Force, supra note 43, at 33 (“Legislation should be 
proposed and enacted that would . . . [r]equire restitution in all cases, unless the court provides specific 
reasons for failing to require it.”).
45. Pub. L. No. 97–291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006)).
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 Prior to the VWPA, courts rarely ordered or enforced restitution, granting it 
only as a condition of probation.46 But because of the movement, and at the request 
of the president’s task force, Congress dramatically altered the federal restitution 
framework by encouraging courts to impose restitution with the VWPA. Specifically, 
the VWPA granted courts discretion to order restitution independent of probation 
and “in conjunction with imprisonment, fine, suspended sentence, or other sentence 
imposed by the court.”47 This discretion, however, was limited, requiring courts to 
consider “the financial resources and other assets of the defendant . . . projected 
earnings and other income of the defendant and any financial obligations of the 
defendant including obligations to dependents.”48 Essentially, this limitation all but 
guaranteed that restitution awards did not exceed a perpetrator’s ability to pay.
 Although the VWPA broadened the availability of restitution, Congress 
determined that federal judges were still not ordering restitution frequently enough to 
satisfy the objectives of the victims’ rights movement or the president’s task force,49 and 
limiting courts’ discretion based on the offender’s circumstances continued to place 
victims’ needs second.50 In response, Congress amended the VWPA with the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in 1996.51 The MVRA, which instituted mandatory 
restitution for certain crimes, was constructed to “reflect a fundamental shift in the 
purpose of restitution . . . to an attempt to provide those who suffer the consequences 
of crime with some means of recouping their personal and financial losses.”52 Congress 
acknowledged the problem of offender indigence in requiring mandatory restitution, 
yet yielded to the needs of victims who, it suggested, could benefit from even nominal 
awards or be compensated if their perpetrator eventually obtained monetary resources 
46. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1688. In other words, judges were limited to ordering restitution only as a 
part of a probationary sentence. S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982). “As a matter of practice, even that 
discretionary grant of authority [was] infrequently used and indifferently enforced. In this respect, 
federal criminal courts [went] the way of their state counterparts, reducing restitution from being an 
inevitable if not exclusive sanction to being an occasional afterthought.” Id.
47. S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 32. 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (2006).
49. See S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13 (1995). “Unfortunately, however, while significant strides have been 
made since 1982 toward a more victim-centered justice system, much progress remains to be made in 
the area of victim restitution.” Id. In 1994, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Annual 
Report, federal courts ordered restitution in only 20.2% of criminal cases. Id.
50. See 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3556, 3663–64 (2006); see Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689 (“Congress’s primary 
motivation in enacting the MVRA was the belief that the VWPA’s restitution framework had not 
adequately compensated crime victims . . . Congress aspired to ensure that victims receive the restitution 
that they are due.”).
52. Beth Bates Holliday, Who Is a “Victim” Entitled to Restitution Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
of 1996 (18 U.S.C. § 3663A), 26 A.L.R. Fed.2d 283 (2008) (analyzing cases defining who is a “victim” 
for purposes of the MVRA).
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that would allow for payment.53 Essentially, Congress created the MVRA to make the 
victim the “primary consideration in the sentencing process.”54
 Accordingly, Congress enumerated certain offenses under the MVRA that 
require a restitution order upon conviction.55 Offenses of sexual exploitation against 
children, including the possession of child pornography, are crimes subject to the 
MVRA.56 The MVRA mandates restitution be paid to the victim for “the full 
amount of the victim’s losses,”57 which are defined as:
[C]osts incurred by the victim for—
 (A)  medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
 (B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
 (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; 
 (D) lost income;
 (E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
 (F)  any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the 
offense.58
The statute has been the subject of debate and varying interpretations.59 As a result, 
courts have disagreed on the proper application of the MVRA to the crime of 
possession.60
iii.  rEstitUtiOn is nOt thE prOpEr rEMEdY fOr pOssEssiOn Of ChiLd 
pOrnOgraphY
 Both courts and commentators have requested that Congress provide guidance on 
the application of the MVRA to crimes of possession.61 A brief investigation into the 
current restitution framework as it is applied to possession cases demonstrates why 
53. S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995).
54. 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde). For a more detailed 
discussion of the statutory history of criminal restitution and its evolution as applied to sex crimes, see 
generally Bradley P. Reiss, Restitution Devolution?, 85 St. John’s L. Rev. 1621, 1627–30 (2011) (arguing 
for a shift from restitution to a victim compensation fund).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) (2006). “[I]n addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, the 
court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.” Id. (emphasis added).
56. 18 U.S.C.A § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (West 2009). Section 2252A, which is the provision prohibiting the 
possession of child pornography, is an offense listed under the same chapter as § 2259. Therefore, 
mandatory restitution applies to the crime of possession. Id. § 2259(a).
57. Id. § 2259(b)(1).
58. Id. § 2259(3).
59. See, e.g., Jacques, supra note 18, at 1181–82 (arguing that the plain language of the statute is not clear).
60. E.g., id. at 1184 (acknowledging the disagreement among courts); see infra notes 68, 73 and accompanying 
text.
61. See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 54, at 1650 (citing United States v. Solsbury, 727 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796–97 
(D.N.D. 2010)).
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Congress needs to take action to develop a new framework for compensating victims. 
First, the current framework creates inconsistencies for both victims and offenders 
because courts can either apply restitution—and do so in a wide range of amounts—or 
decide against a restitution order completely. Second, restitution orders can often result 
in disproportionate punishments that risk violating the Eighth Amendment and curtail 
the accountability of producers. Third, restitution often fails to adequately restore 
victims because victims are rarely able to collect awards from their defendants and the 
total amount of restitution awarded regularly fails to reflect the actual rate at which the 
crime of possession is committed against a single victim. Moreover, the procedural 
steps to obtain restitution can be detrimental to victims, while other victims are often 
left empty-handed because they are not identified prior to prosecution.
 A. Application of Restitution in Possession Cases Has Created Harmful Inconsistencies
 The majority of courts have interpreted the MVRA to require a finding of 
proximate cause between the crime and the victim’s harm before ordering restitution 
in the full amount of the victim’s losses.62 Proximate cause limits the legal 
responsibility of an individual and demands a “direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”63 Therefore, in possession cases, the 
question is whether a defendant, by viewing images of the victim, caused her harm in 
the form of emotional and psychological suffering.
 Finding a direct relationship between mere possession and the harm suffered by 
the child is an abstract idea, which can involve “connect[ing] the dots” of causation in 
a very attenuated manner.64 This notion, that a person who possesses child 
pornography directly harms the child victim, often draws criticism because it 
“stretches personal accountability to the breaking point” and feels as though “forcing 
payment from people who do not produce such images but only possess them goes 
too far.”65 In other words, there is question as to how an individual can be required to 
pay a specific victim when they did not physically touch, let alone personally harm, 
that victim.66 Yet, on the other hand, victims are considered personally harmed by an 
end-user because the victim’s knowledge of an individual viewing a record of his or 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645 (6th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel, 641 
F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Laney, 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). But see In 
re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Christy, No. 10-cr-1534, 2012 WL 
3255107 (D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2012).
63. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154 (quoting Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
64. See John Schwartz, Court Rejects Restitution for Victim in Porn Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2011, at A20.
65. Schwartz, supra note 10.
66. See id. (noting a sex crime expert’s view that the harm caused by possessors is less direct than the harm 
caused by abusers).
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her abuse exacerbates the harm stemming from the original abuse.67 In turn, courts, 
even within the same circuit, have reached no consensus on whether, and when, the 
possession of child pornography is the proximate cause of a victim’s harm.68 This 
disagreement has created inconsistencies not only for the criminal justice system, but 
also for both victims and offenders.
 First, this discrepancy creates inconsistencies that are problematic for both 
defendants and victims because possession of an image in one jurisdiction may result 
in a restitution order to the victim, but possession of the same image in another 
jurisdiction may result in no restitution order.69 This fails to put a defendant on 
notice of the potential punishment, which minimizes any deterrent effect restitution 
might have.70 Further, victims end up gambling with their time and energy by 
petitioning for restitution in jurisdictions that have found proximate cause in some 
cases, but not in others.71 With only the mere possibility of restitution, a victim may 
not only expend time, but also money on legal fees and costs, and suffer trauma from 
testifying or making statements regarding the harm suffered.72
67. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (stating that “harm to child is exacerbated by [image] 
circulation”); United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Having paid others to 
‘act out’ for him, the victims are no less damaged for his having remained safely at home.”); United States 
v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (“The victim’s knowledge of 
publication of the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”).
68. Compare United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 659 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding proximate cause between the 
victim’s harm and the possessor’s conduct), United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 459–60 (4th Cir. 
2012) (same), United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2012) (same), United States v. 
McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011) (same), United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (same), United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (same), 
United States v. Lundquist, 847 F. Supp. 2d 364, 370 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (same), United States v. Stowers, 
No. cr-10-74, 2011 WL 3022188, at *3 (E.D. Okla. July 22, 2011), Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613–14 
(same), Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (same), and United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 
WL 2579103, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (same), with United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 
1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding a lack of proximate cause between the victim’s harm and the possessor’s 
conduct), Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154 (same), United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 
2011) (same), United States v. Martin, No. 2:10-cr-95, 2012 WL 3597436, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 
2012) (same), United States v. Simon, No. CR-08-0907, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 
2009) (same), and United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 
Dec. 17, 2009).
69. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1189 (“[T]here are two unfortunate, polar consequences: some courts bar 
recovery for victims while others force offenders to pay large amounts that have attenuated connection 
to the harm actually caused.”).
70. See Dennis F. DiBari, Restoring Restitution: The Role of Proximate Causation in Child Pornography 
Possession Cases Where Restitution Is Sought, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 297, 310 (“Restitution’s ability to 
closely track the harm caused by the crime functions as a powerful deterrent, since it warns potential 
offenders that they will be responsible for every penny of harm they cause.”); In re Silverman, 616 F.3d 
1001, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[R]estitution furthers the traditional sentencing goals of rehabilitation and 
deterrence, by forcing defendants to directly witness the effects of their crimes.”).
71. See cases cited supra note 68. For example, the Second Circuit found a lack of probable cause in Aumais, 
but subsequently, a court in the Northern District of New York found the presence of proximate cause 
in Lundquist.
72. See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
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 Among the courts that have found the presence of proximate cause in possession 
cases, there is further disagreement on the proper way to calculate the amount of a 
restitution order.73 Upon a finding of proximate causation, a court must calculate 
how much restitution is warranted by estimating the specific losses caused by the 
defendant.74 However, a court is left with a “legal quandary” because the MVRA 
does not provide a specific calculation method.75 Without a designated method, 
judges have full reign in determining their own.76 Not surprisingly, this has resulted 
in a wide range of calculation methods and varying restitution amounts. Some courts 
have adopted a set amount for each defendant convicted of possession.77 This amount 
is based on a very small percentage of the civil remedy available to victims of child 
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which typically is around $3000 and equals 
two percent of the $150,000 available under the civil statute.78 Other courts have 
permitted the government and the defendant to stipulate to a restitution amount.79 
One court granted restitution in the full amount of the victim’s losses, which totaled 
a little over $3.5 million.80
 This discrepancy in restitution awards also fails to put defendants on notice and 
therefore reduces any deterrent effect restitution might have on possessors. Further, 
victims are again placed in a risky position when petitioning for assistance. Therefore, 
a more dependable and consistent system of compensation would not only benefit 
victims, but also provide potential possessors with explicit notice of the potential 
punishment upon conviction.
 Not only does the application of restitution to possession cases create huge 
discrepancies in award amounts, but it also places too much discretion in the hands of 
the judiciary, which is inconsistent with the language and intent behind the MVRA.81 
The lack of both guidance on proximate cause and a standard calculation method 
73. McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1270 (“[W]e note that disparate decisions by district courts across the nation 
demonstrate that there is no universal means for determining a proper restitution amount.”). The great 
disparity among courts on these issues has sparked several in-depth analyses of case law nationwide. For 
a detailed look into the these discrepancies and the cases mentioned in this note, see Reiss, supra note 
54, at 1633–36; Giblin, supra note 42, at 1121–29; Jacques, supra note 18, at 1185–87.
74. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (“[Defendant] 
is required to pay [the victim] the full amount of losses as a result of the harm she suffered.”). 
75. United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009).
76. See id.
77. See id. at *6; United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App’x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ferenci, No. 
1:08-CR-0414, 2009 WL 2579102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); United States v. Monk, No. 1:08-
CR-0365, 2009 WL 2567831, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009).
78. Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, at *6; 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Granato, No. 2:08-cr-198 (D. Nev. filed Aug. 28, 2009).
80. United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009). The court 
calculated the full amount of the victim’s losses by adding the loss of future wages and employee benefits 
through the age of sixty-seven with the future treatment and counseling costs through the age of eighty-
one, which totaled $3,680,153. Id.
81. See Lewis, supra note 6, at 419–20.
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permits one judge to order a huge restitution sum, while another judge can decline 
restitution altogether and, in effect, ignore the mandate of the MVRA, which states 
that “the court shall order restitution for any offense under this chapter.”82 This 
discretion does not comport with the plain language of the MVRA, nor is it consistent 
with Congress’s intent, which was to make victims the primary consideration in 
sentencing and restore them financially.83 Section 2259 applies to all offenses listed 
under the chapter—which includes possession of child pornography—and explicitly 
states that “[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section is mandatory.”84 
Clearly, “[t]hrough the enactment of the MVRA, Congress essentially decided that 
defendants found guilty of crimes involving child pornography should never be able to 
avoid an order of restitution and deny a victim monetary recourse for the harm caused 
by being victimized through child pornography.”85 Therefore, whether restitution 
should be granted is not a decision that Congress placed with the courts; the legislature 
stripped the judiciary of this discretion by making restitution mandatory.86 This 
discretion, created from a lack of guidance, diverges from the spirit of the MVRA 
and allows courts to overstep their authority.87
 B. Restitution Orders Are Disproportionate to the Offense of Possession
 The application of restitution to cases of possession also creates problems of 
proportionality in punishment and liability. First, issuing restitution orders to 
possessors lends itself to the risk of violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against excessive fines.88 Second, applying restitution to cases of possession can skew 
the assignment of liability by disproportionately placing it on possessors rather than 
on those who actually abused the children.89
 Under the Eighth Amendment, a fine is deemed excessive when the payment is 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.90 A restitution order for $3.5 million, 
like the one in United States v. Staples, could be viewed as disproportionate to the 
gravity of possession.91 Requiring a huge sum from an individual who did not physically 
82. 18 U.S.C § 2259(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
83. See id. (emphasis added); 141 Cong. Rec. H1302 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
85. Lewis, supra note 6, at 421–22; accord United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 
2259 is phrased in generous terms in order to compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the care 
required to address the long term effects of their abuse.”).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (2006).
87. Lewis, supra note 6, at 421–22.
88. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334.
89. Id. at 1344.
90. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry 
under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must 
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).
91. No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009).
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abuse the victim or produce the image feels inherently unbalanced. Additionally, even 
in the absence of a huge restitution amount, a restitution order can be disproportional 
when there is no direct proof that the defendant’s conduct caused the specific losses.92 
For instance, in United States v. Brunner, the court found that the victim impact 
statements and psychological reports supported a finding of proximate cause, even 
though neither document named the defendant personally.93 Findings such as these may 
violate the Eighth Amendment because, when causation is not proven, a possessor could 
be required to pay the victim for losses caused by other individuals.94 Any restitution 
amount paid, therefore, would not be proportionate to the defendant’s offense.95
 Additionally, ordering restitution from possessors can distort the assignment of 
liability by failing to hold producers and distributors accountable.96 Beyond victim 
restoration, traditional goals of restitution include deterrence and rehabilitation, both 
of which can be satisfied in individual cases of possession “by forcing defendants to 
directly witness the effects of their crime[].”97 However, on a global scale, issuing 
92. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“This Court is of the opinion 
that a restitution order under section 2259 that is not limited to losses proximately caused by the 
defendant’s conduct would under most facts, including these, violate the Eighth Amendment.”), vacated, 
In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).
93. No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010).
94. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1334. In In re Amy Unknown, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a 
restitution order in the absence of proximate cause violated the Eighth Amendment. 701 F.3d at 752. 
Specifically, the court found no Eighth Amendment concerns “[i]n light of restitution’s remedial nature, 
§ 2259’s built-in causal requirements, and the mechanisms described under § 3664.” Id. at 772. 
Although case law has offered little guidance on whether the Eighth Amendment prohibition on 
excessive fines applies to restitution orders, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Eighth 
Amendment applies to restitution orders so long as it is not “grossly disproportional to the defendant’s 
culpability.” United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042, 2009 WL 4928050, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 
17, 2009) (citing United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming MVRA 
restitution awards in the amount of $121,403.10 and $4,510.00 for bank robbery and holding restitution 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines, both facially and as 
applied)); United States v. Seigel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Dubose 
approvingly)). Additionally, whether possession defendants are subject to joint and several liability 
under § 3664, forcing them to pay for others’ harms, is also unclear in the case law. See, e.g., United 
States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-00202, 2012 WL 1430540, at *4 n.7 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing United 
States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). However, several courts have held that joint and 
several liability is inappropriate where the defendant did not proximately cause all of the victim’s injuries 
and where they would have to pay for the losses caused by defendants in separate cases, including losses 
attributable to the initial abuse. Monzel, 641 F.3d at 538; Veazie, 2012 WL 1430540, at *4 n.7; United 
States v. Olivieri, No. 09-cr-743, 2012 WL 1118763, at *10–11 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012). Accordingly, 
despite the Fifth Circuit’s recent findings, restitution orders in these cases may still raise Eighth 
Amendment concerns.
95. See Dubose, 146 F.3d at 1145 (finding that restitution orders under the MVRA must not be grossly 
disproportional to the crime committed to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment); Olivieri, 2012 
WL 1118763, at *10; United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 188 n.5 (D. Me. 2009).
96. See McLeod, supra note 17, at 1344.
97. In re Silverman, 616 F.3d 1001, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010); accord Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 
(1986) (“Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in 
concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.”).
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restitution orders to possessors can actually “underdeter those who cause the greatest 
harms”—the producers.98 Consider the example of “Amy,” who as a child was featured 
in a widely viewed series of pornographic images:
[Her] uncle, her original abuser, paid only $6,000 in restitution. Yet, in the 
first year alone, Amy received $170,000 in restitution from child pornography 
possession defendants. She now seeks a total of $3.4 million from those who 
possess her images. No matter how generously one “slices the pie” of fault, one 
cannot imagine that the amount paid by the original abuse is a proportional 
representation of his contribution to the harm.99
The disproportionate assignment of liability on possessors minimizes the extent to 
which producers are responsible for a victim’s harm and for the child pornography 
industry in general.100 In order to avoid these problems, Congress needs to create a 
system that punishes possessors proportionately to the crime.
 C. Restitution Fails to Restore Victims of Possession
 One of the main purposes of restitution is to make the victim of a crime “whole” 
again, or, in other words, “to restore someone to the position she occupied before a 
particular event.”101 In this vein, the MVRA was established to “move ‘toward a 
more victim-centered justice system,’ which would help transform a criminal justice 
system that Congress believed was ignoring the plight of victims.”102 The use of 
restitution in possession cases, however, often fails to adequately restore victims; 
specifically, victims rarely collect money from an order and the total amount of 
restitution awarded per victim does not accurately ref lect the actual number of 
individuals who view their images. Further, the process for obtaining restitution is in 
fact detrimental to many victims, while other victims, who are not identified before 
prosecution, are left empty-handed. Each of these issues is addressed in turn below.
 First, the collection rate of restitution judgments is alarmingly low.103 Defendants 
often lack the ability “to pay restitution because of incarceration, indigency, or 
98. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1344.
99. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. See id. Notably, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Amy Unknown, addressed the “concern that individual 
defendants may bear a greater restitutionary burden than others convicted of possessing the same 
victim’s images” and found that this concern does not implicate an absurd result. 701 F.3d 749, 772 (5th 
Cir. 2012). However, this concern is different from the one suggested by this note; specifically, that 
possessors will bear a greater burden of the restitutionary burden than those causing greater harm to the 
victims, the abusers and producers. 
101. United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (citing 
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990)); accord United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 
603 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Courts have found that restitution is not only a means of making a victims 
whole, but also serves punitive and rehabilitative purposes.”).
102. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 13 (1995)).
103. See, e.g., Office for Victims of Crime, Restitution: Making It Work 1 (Nov. 2002), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin5/ncj189193.pdf. Although there is 
limited data on the collection of restitution on a national level, a recent study of restitution in Colorado 
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unemployment.”104 Therefore, victims who risk the time and emotional energy to 
request restitution from possessors may wait indefinitely to see any portion of their 
judgment. Further, if a victim does in fact receive her full award, she will have to pay 
a large portion—in most cases one-third of her judgment—to her attorney in fees 
and costs.105 The false hope created by an order can only compound the existing 
mental and emotional pain experienced by victims of child pornography.106 This 
limited recovery of money may force victims, and the community, to lose respect for 
and satisfaction in the criminal justice system.107 Also, from a financial cost-benefit 
analysis standpoint, staffing and running programs to collect restitution often cost 
more than the amount of money requested in the order.108 This suggests that an 
alternative to restitution could provide a more beneficial use of state resources—for 
instance, by placing these additional funds into a compensation fund for victims.109
 The staggering amount of end-users and the consistent circulation of images also 
demonstrate why restitution can be improper for possession cases.110 The rate at which 
can provide insight. See id. at 1, 4. In 1996, offenders in Colorado were ordered to pay their victims $26 
million, but as of 2002 they still owed more than $20 million. Id. at 1; see also Jacques, supra note 18, at 
1195 (“Getting a judge’s order is one matter; a convict’s payment is another.”).
104. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1195.
Over 85 percent of federal criminal defendants are indigent at the time of their arrest, 
and nearly half of offenders made less than $600 during the month prior to their offense. 
Moreover, the government often seizes the assets an offender may accumulate from his 
or her illegal activity prior to conviction, making these assets unavailable for the 
satisfaction of restitution judgments. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the 
economic situation of most inmates does not improve upon release. The average inmate 
has little in the way of education or marketable job skills, and job opportunities tend to 
be limited in the communities to which prisoners return. Moreover, a criminal conviction 
frequently acts as a major impediment to employment.
 Dickman, supra note 20, 1695 (citations omitted).
105. Reiss, supra note 54, at 1641. In 2010, one victim had been awarded $40,000 in restitution, yet received 
only $10,000, while the rest went towards attorney’s fees and advanced costs. Id. (citing United States v. 
Faxon, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).
106. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1689–99. “Supporting this notion is the fact that probation officers and 
prosecutors report having to help victims who are granted a restitution order to see it as a ‘symbolic 
victory,’ so that victims are not significantly let down when they do not ultimately receive restitution 
from the offender.” Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1700–01.
108. Id. at 1708–09 (“[F]or many restitution judgments, the government is spending considerably more than 
the offender can be expected to pay or the victim can be expected to receive.”); Reiss, supra note 54, at 
1639–40 (noting that awarding restitution involves “use of expert testimony, additional evidentiary 
hearings, further briefing, appeals, and added procedual technicalities if the victim is a minor,” which 
drive up administrative costs).
109. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1708 (“The reason that such programs often do not withstand economic 
scrutiny is that when the sole aim is to reimburse victims, the cost of staffing and running programs 
relative to the funds collected might suggest that public monies would better be provided directly to 
crime victims through crime victim compensation programs.”) (citation omitted).
110. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342.
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individuals view and receive child pornography, even with respect to one specific 
image or victim, is much higher than the rate at which those offenders are apprehended 
and convicted.111 Consequently, victims are never fully restored and made whole. For 
instance, consider again “Amy,” who is the principle victim in one of the most 
commonly circulated collections of child pornography, the “Misty” series.112 Research 
conducted by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) 
has uncovered a total of 35,750 images associated with the Misty series and, in 2009 
alone, found 8860 images associated with the same series.113 Next, consider the federal 
prosecution rate of child pornography crimes, which in 2006 was a mere 1203 cases.114 
Comparing these numbers demonstrates how a victim, such as “Amy,” whose original 
harm is exacerbated with each viewing, can never actually recover the full amount of 
restitution theoretically owed to her; the number of images available increases the 
number of possessors, the majority of which will never be prosecuted based on the 
current statistics.115 Under the “restorative view” of criminal justice—which serves as 
the premise of the MVRA—a crime is a violation of a victim’s right and provides a 
benefit to the offender, which creates an imbalance between them.116 Restitution, in 
turn, should strive to rectify this imbalance.117 In cases of possession, however, this 
imbalance cannot be fully cured when any amount a victim receives will be so 
disproportionate to the actual number of offenders viewing the images; a victim under 
this framework cannot be made whole.
 Additionally, the process by which victims petition for restitution under the 
current framework contains several prerequisites that are counterintuitive to the 
victim-centered goals of restitution. First, victims are notified each time an offender 
has been arrested for possessing the victim’s image.118 In order to receive restitution, 
a victim must then send a request to the prosecutor, who will present the claim to the 
court at sentencing.119 Therefore, these notifications are essential in providing victims 
with opportunity for restitution. As one can imagine, however, these notifications 
add to the lasting psychological harm of the victim.120 A victim named “Vicky,” who 
is the subject of a widespread series of images, explained this as follows:
111. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1702.
112. Giblin, supra note 42, at 1111.
113. Id. at 1110 n.8.
114. Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice; BJS Bull. No. NCJ 219412, Federal 
Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 2006 2 (2007). This statistic does not specify 
the prosecution rate for the individual crimes of possession, distribution, and production, but 
encompasses all child pornography related crimes.
115. See Dickman, supra note 20, at 1702.
116. See Giblin, supra note 42, at 1116–17.
117. Id.
118. See sources cited supra note 21.
119. McLeod, supra note 17, at 1331.
120. See United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2010).
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I learn about each [defendant] because of the Victim Notices. I have a right to 
know who has the pictures of me. The Notice puts [a] name on the fear that I 
already had and also adds to it. When I learn about one defendant having 
downloaded the pictures of me, it adds to my paranoia, it makes me feel again 
like I was being abused by another man who had been leering at pictures of my 
naked body being tortured, it gives me chills to think about it. I live in fear that 
any of them[] may try to find me and contact me and do something to me.121
Although victim notifications were implemented to aid victims, the effects of the 
notifications can clearly be detrimental to victims.122 Under the current framework, 
however, these notifications are an unavoidable evil if victims want to receive restitution.
 Next, the current restitution framework relies on victim identification.123 
Offenders cannot be ordered to pay restitution unless there is an identified victim; 
yet law enforcement consistently has difficulty identifying victims because of the 
Internet’s anonymity.124 Further, the efforts in locating victims are also frustrated 
because a large percentage of child pornography is produced in foreign countries.125 
The distance and “insufficient political will” of some foreign countries can hinder 
overseas efforts,126 complicating an already difficult task that requires the cooperation 
of both domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies.127 Consequently, an operation 
to locate victims abroad, if successful, can take a significant amount of time. 
Therefore, victims who may be identified after a prosecution are not able to recover 
restitution from that possessor, yet at the same time guilty offenders are freed from 
121. Id.
122. E.g., id.
123. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194.
124. Id.; Chelsea McLean, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 Cornell J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 221, 237 n.149 (2007) (noting that the “only records of online pornography trading are logs” 
that “are often discarded”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The National Strategy for Child Exploitation 
Prevention and Interdiction: Report to Congress 3 (2010) [hereinafter National Strategy]. 
Federal law enforcement agencies have specific agencies dedicated to combating child pornography, such 
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Innocent Images National Initiative, the Department of Justice’s 
Child and Exploitation and Obscenity Section, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 
(ICE) Cyber Crimes Center. Alongside state taskforces, these federal agencies work together to keep 
each other informed on the identities of both offenders and victims. See Michael J. Henzey, Going on the 
Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal 
Action, 11 Appalachian J. L. 1, 38–39 (2011) (providing an overview of federal law enforcement agencies 
and their tactics in fighting child pornography). Most importantly, these agencies utilize NCMEC, 
which is a non-profit organization that runs a national tip-line and Child Victim Identification Program 
(CVIP). Id. The CVIP is the central repository for information regarding identified children of child 
pornography images. Id.
125. See Jacques, supra note 18, 1194.
126. ECPAT Int’l, Global Monitoring: Status of Action Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 19 
(2012), http://www.ecpat.net/EI/Pdf/A4A_II/A4A_V2_AM_USA.pdf.
127. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 124, at 57. The International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) in Washinton, D.C. works with ICE, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and 
NCMEC, along with domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies, to locate unidentified and 
missing victims of child exploitation. Id.
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the responsibility of paying for a victim’s losses.128 This result is unfair and undermines 
the fundamental premise of restitution: to restore victims.129
iV. COngrEss shOULd iMpLEMEnt a ViCtiMs COMpEnsatiOn prOgraM
 Guidance from Congress on the proper application of the MVRA in cases of 
child possession would not eliminate the problems with the current restitution 
framework. Therefore, instead, Congress should remove the crime of possession 
from the MVRA’s mandatory restitution.130 Simultaneously, Congress should create 
a national crime victims compensation program specifically designed to allow victims 
of child pornography to claim compensation for the harm caused by possessors.131 
This new system, funded by fines paid by offenders, will provide consistency to 
victims and offenders, lessen the possibility of disproportionate punishments and 
unbalanced liability, and satisfy victim needs.
 Abandoning the current criminal restitution framework in exchange for a 
compensation program for victims of possession was first suggested in United States 
v. Paroline. Judge Leonard Davis explained in a footnote:
While Congress was obviously well intended in attempting to create a 
statutory framework to help compensate victims of child pornography, it has 
unfortunately created one that is largely unworkable in the context of criminal 
restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 2255, however, does provide a civil remedy for those 
victims able to obtain counsel to pursue it. There is a great need for counseling 
and medical care for victims of child pornography. Perhaps a statutory 
provision requiring that fines for child pornography be paid to a national center 
that would act as a trustee to disburse funds for counseling of victims of child 
pornography would do more to help these victims than the seemingly 
unworkable criminal restitution provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 2259.132
In recognizing the current framework as “unworkable,” Judge Davis recommended a 
transition to an independent system to adequately compensate victims.133 Crime 
victim compensation programs are consistently praised for providing victims with 
the monetary funds necessary to recover from their victimization.134 These programs 
128. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194.
129. See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. Renga, No. 
1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009).
130. See generally McLeod, supra note 17, at 1342–45 (explaining the serious policy concerns associated with 
holding possessors liable under § 2259).
131. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, In re Amy 
Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See id. 
134. E.g., Frédéric Mégret, Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court’s Victims Trust Fund: 
Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 123, 131 (2010) (finding that the 
emergence of compensation programs “ranks as one of the most significant criminological developments in 
the Western world and beyond of the last four decades”); Benedict J. Monachino, Enhancing Victims’ Rights: 
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have been used to provide organized relief to victims in a variety of contexts. For 
instance, funds have been established in mass tort class action lawsuits, including the 
asbestos and Diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases, and also in emergency situations for 
victims of crime or national disasters, most notably the 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund, and the BP Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.135 
The most common funds, however, are state-level compensation programs, which 
provide assistance to victims of both federal and state crimes.136
 In creating a new system, Congress should use the International Terrorism 
Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) as a model.137 ITVERP is the 
only federally administered compensation program designed to assist victims of a 
specific crime.138 The program was created under the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) 
and allows eligible victims of international terrorism to claim compensation for their 
victimization directly from a designated federal fund.139 Adopting a program similar 
to ITVERP, with some modifications, would eliminate the problems presented by 
the current restitution framework as applied to the crime of possession.
 A. ITVERP Background
 ITVERP was created in part to resolve a discrepancy in victim compensation.140 
Currently, victims of both federal and state crimes are primarily compensated through 
state programs, which each have their own policies for awarding compensation.141 As 
a result, victims of the same act of terrorism were receiving different amounts of 
Crime Victims Compensation, 80 N.Y. St. B.J. 36, 41 (Mar./Apr. 2008) (“[C]rime victims compensation has 
become a vibrant force in advancing the rights of victims. Each time compensation benefits are expanded, 
crime victims are another step closer to restoring balance to the criminal justice system.”).
135. See Reiss, supra note 54, at 1644–45; see also Guidelines for the Anti-Terrorism and Emergency 
Assistance Program for Terrorism and Mass Violence Crimes, 67 Fed. Reg. 4822, 4825 (Jan. 31, 2002) 
(“[The Office for Victims of Crime]’s mission is to enhance the nation’s capacity to assist victims of 
crime and . . . to promote justice and healing for all victims” by, in addition to other programs, 
establishing a compensation program for victims of international terrorism).
136. See infra note 141. 
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 10603c (2006).
138. See source cited infra note 142; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(3)(A) (2006).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 10601(d)(5)(B) (2006) (granting the Office of Victims of Crime power to use federal 
funds for ITVERP); id. § 10603c(b) (establishing an award of compensation to victims of international 
terrorism from the federal Crime Victims Fund).
140. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug. 
24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(5) (2006). The federal Crime Victims Fund allocates monies to eligible state 
crime victim compensation programs. Id. § 10601(d)(4)(A). State crime victim compensation programs 
are only eligible for funding if they “provide compensation to victims of Federal crimes occurring within 
the State on the same basis that such program provides compensation to victims of State crimes.” Id. 
§ 10602(b)(5).
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compensation.142 In response, Congress stripped states of their obligation to 
compensate victims of international terrorism and created ITVERP as an independent, 
federal program.143
 Under ITVERP, the federal government is required to “ensure[] that victims 
from all 50 states, including the U.S. territories and United States employees in 
foreign countries, will receive fair and equitable reimbursement for comparable 
expenses.”144 Specifically, ITVERP allows claimants to seek reimbursement for the 
following: (1) medical expenses up to $50,000; (2) mental health care costs not to 
exceed $5000; (3) property loss, repair, or replacement costs not to exceed $10,000; 
(4) funeral and burial costs not to exceed $25,000; and (5) miscellaneous expenses 
(such as lodging, emergency travel, local transportation, and telephone costs) not to 
exceed $15,000.145
 Eligible claimants under ITVERP include U.S. nationals and U.S. government 
officers and employees who have “suffered direct physical or emotional injury or death 
as a result of international terrorism on or after October 23, 1983, with respect to which 
an investigation of civil or criminal prosecution was ongoing after April 24, 1996.”146 
Unlike state compensation programs, which either promote or require victim cooperation 
with law enforcement, ITVERP does not require similar participation;147 it simply 
requires that there be an investigation of, or prosecution related to, the act of terrorism.148 
This framework allows victims to claim compensation without suffering through the 
hardships attached to testifying or participating in the criminal justice process.149
142. Office for Victims of Crime, International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement 
Program: Report to Congress 3 (2008) [hereinafter ITVERP Report].
Each state determines the level of compensation and assistance for crime victims via 
state legislation. Prior to ITVERP, a victim’s only recourse was compensation through 
state programs. This was problematic because survivors of the same act of terrorism 
outside the United States, who are residents of different states, may conceivably receive 
different levels of compensation for similar injuries from their state programs.
 Id.
143. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug. 
24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94). “Partially in recognition of this disparity in treatment, VOCA 
was amended so that states shall no longer be required to compensate victims of international terrorism 
occurring outside the United States, and the federal government shall oversee an expense reimbursement 
program for these victims.” Id.; see Victims of Trafficking Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. 106386, § 
2003(c)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1544–46 (2000).
144. ITVERP Report, supra note 142, at 1.
145. Id. at 5.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
147. See id. § 10603c(a)–(c).
148. Id.
149. As a child victim of sexual exploitation, one can experience increased levels of shame by retelling their 
story during the course of the criminal justice system proceedings. See William Wesley Patton, Viewing 
Child Witnesses Through a Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Proceedings Lens: How Attorneys’ Ethical Duties 
Exacerbate Children’s Psychopathology, 16 Widener L. Rev. 369, 376–77 (2010). Additionally, “[t]he 
process of testifying and of being cross-examined is obviously contraindicated with psychiatric 
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 ITVERP is supported by the Crime Victims Fund, which was established by 
VOCA, and is primarily funded by criminal fines, fees, penalty assessments, and 
forfeitures paid by federal offenders.150 The Crime Victims Fund is typically delegated 
to state victim compensation programs; however, a portion of the fund is reserved for 
ITVERP. As a result, states are stripped of their obligation to compensate victims of 
international terrorism and, instead, these victims collect compensation solely 
through ITVERP.151
 B. ITVERP Is the Most Appropriate Model for the Fund
  1. ITVERP Model Would Create Consistency for Possession Victims
 Similarly to ITVERP, which was established on a federal level to eliminate the 
inconsistencies in state compensation programs, Congress needs to create a new 
federal system for restoring victims of child pornography and avoiding the 
inconsistencies created by the current restitution system.
 Using ITVERP as a model, the new program for victims of child pornography 
should disperse funds to victims equally and consistently. However, Congress would 
not reimburse victims for the same expenses as victims of international terrorism.152 
Instead, the new program should compensate victims only for their mental and 
psychological suffering arising from the possession of their images.153 As a result, the 
new program would be less complicated and more predictable than ITVERP.
 Additionally, this new program should issue a single, standard dollar amount to 
eligible victim-claimants, regardless of the number of images of them available or 
the number of known possessors.154 Unlike ITVERP, which calculates reimbursement 
on an individual basis, each victim of child pornography should receive the same 
amount of compensation in order to cover the mental health expenses related to 
procedures aimed at helping abused children regain emotional health.” Id. at 375. For instance, while 
mental health professionals attempt to provide patients with a safe and nonjudgmental environment for 
disclosure, testifying in a courtroom full of strangers fails to provide that recommended environment. 
See id. Further, traveling to participate in the criminal justice process can also put an additional financial 
burden on victims. 
150. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518, 49518 (proposed 
Aug. 24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94).
151. Id. 
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982)) (“The victim’s knowledge of publication of the visual 
material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”). Victims of child pornography 
can also pursue remedies through civil tort actions against their producers, distributors, and possessors. 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). This new system would provide victims with an opportunity to easily and 
efficiently obtain compensation for only the mental health expenses related to the possession of their 
images.
154. See Reiss, supra note 54, at 1643–48 (arguing for the implementation of a compensation program for 
child pornography victims and asserting that a standard award amount would benefit victims and create 
equality).
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recovering from the effects of possessors viewing his or her images. Undeniably, each 
victim’s experience is unique and each recovery will vary in cost. Accordingly, this 
standard amount will likely be subject to criticism for failing to consider the 
individual characteristics of each victim’s situation, such as the number of images in 
circulation and the exacerbated effect on a victim.155 Yet, providing a standard 
compensation amount would eliminate judicial discretion, create consistency, and 
would be easier to administer than restitution. The question of proximate cause, 
moreover, which has split courts and as a result created a huge disparity among 
restitution awards for victims, would be inapposite because nationwide victims would 
receive equal compensation for their suffering without having to prove that their 
harm directly resulted from an offender possessing their image.
 On the other side of the equation, under this proposed model, Congress will also 
need to require a standard fine from those convicted of possessing child pornography.156 
This standard fine will create a proportional penalty for possessors that adheres to the 
traditional punitive motives behind restitution. A standard fine will also provide 
notice to offenders, in contrast to the current framework, whereby an offender could 
be ordered to pay millions of dollars or nothing at all. Convicted possessors will pay 
their fine directly to the Crime Victims Fund and, similar to ITVERP, Congress 
would funnel these monies directly into a trust within the Crime Victims Fund 
specifically designated for this program. In addition, Congress will need to forgive 
states of their obligation to compensate victims of the crime of possession, if their 
program typically compensated for the crime of possession.157
  2. ITVERP Model Provides for Proportional Punishment
 The standard fine required from possessors should be proportional to the crime 
while also recognizing the seriousness of the harm created.158 Determining the 
amount of this fine will require complex policy and economic considerations. Several 
factors, however, should be thoroughly reviewed in making this determination. The 
155. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986).
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to 
confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty will affect 
the defendant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and 
impersonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the harm the defendant caused. 
Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a 
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine.
 Id.
156. See Jacques, supra note 18, at 1196.
157. State compensation programs are eligible to receive support from the Crime Victims Fund if they 
compensate victims of criminal “violence.” 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (2006). State legislatures define 
those acts that constitute “violence” and therefore may or may not compensate victims for the possession 
of child pornography, which is not inherently a violent act.
158. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry 
under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must 
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).
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first consideration should be the high rate of indigence among criminal defendants.159 
Although the amount needs to be large enough to help support the fund and reflect 
the seriousness of the crime, the fine must be practical and manageable for offenders 
with little means.160 Issuing an extremely high fine would only perpetuate the 
problems with collection under the current restitution framework.
 Second, the proportion of liability imposed on possessors, as compared to 
producers and distributors, should be considered in setting the standard amount 
issued to victims. The existence of proximate cause between a producer or abuser’s 
actions and a victim’s harm has not been contested.161 When courts have applied the 
MVRA to crimes of production and distribution, the issue of proximate cause has 
not precluded restitution awards, nor has it provoked extensive statutory 
interpretation.162 The MVRA works effectively in these cases and therefore should 
remain unchanged in its application to production and distribution of child 
pornography.163 Thus, in some cases, a victim eligible under the new program may 
have already received or will receive restitution from the producer or a distributor 
when he or she applies for compensation. Policymakers, in turn, should consider the 
possibility of this additional award and ensure that the standard amount provided to 
victims of possession globally reflects the portion of harm caused by possessors in 
the circle of abuse that also includes producers, distributors, and countless other end-
users.164
159. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 104 and accompanying text 
161. See United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190–91 (D. Me. 2009) (“It has long been uncontroversial 
to order restitution when the defendant is convicted of actual physical abuse of a child or of producing 
images constituting child pornography.”).
162. United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding restitution award under the 
MVRA in production and abuse case); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1246–48 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(same). Typically, when a defendant is convicted of distribution they are also convicted of production 
and/or possession. At this point, there are no cases applying the MVRA solely to the crime of 
distribution. Accordingly, it is an assumption to say that the crime of distribution does not create the 
same questions regarding proximate cause as the crime of possession.
163. Undoubtedly, some of the problems present in possession cases can also be found in production and 
distribution cases when the MVRA is applied. Specifically, low collection rates and issues with victim 
notifications and identification also exist in those cases. Overall, however, the lack of problems relating 
to consistency and proportionality in production and distribution cases has made the application of 
restitution uncontroversial. See Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 189–92. In determining the scope of the victim 
compensation program, policymakers should consider imposing fines on offenders who have distributed 
child pornography including images of unidentified victims, which may provide an additional level of 
punishment and deterrence, while also funding the program.
164. United States v. Veazie, No. 2:11-cr-00202, 2012 WL 1430540, at *5 (D. Me. Apr. 25, 2012).
The various defendants who have caused [a victim] harm—through creation, distribution, 
and possession of child pornography depicting her abuse—have caused harm in 
substantively different ways and, presumably, in differing amounts. A defendant found 
guilty of distributing child pornography has committed a substantively different offense 
than a defendant found guilty of possession of child pornography and, presumably, the 
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 A starting point for the determination of a standard amount may be an examination 
of the civil remedy statute available for victims of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(a), which has served as the basis of several courts’ restitution calculations.165 
This statute provides that any victim who, as a child, suffered personal injury as a 
result of sexual exploitation “shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less 
than $150,000 in value.”166 By establishing a high dollar amount for damages for these 
crimes, Congress was cognizant of the great harm caused by child pornography.167 
However, requiring a fine near $150,000 would fail to consider the proportionality of 
the crime of possession to the crime of production or abuse.168 Therefore, by spreading 
the $150,000 of damages across possessors and requiring a percentage of that sum as 
a fine, the amount paid by possessors would be more proportional to their actual 
crimes.169 This would eliminate the Eighth Amendment concerns presented by the 
current restitution framework.
  3. ITVERP Model Restores Victims
 A victim-centered fund, modeled after ITVERP, would eliminate the problems 
created by the current restitution framework that regularly leave victims unsatisfied. 
Like ITVERP, compensation under the new program should be made available to all 
eligible victims of child pornography, regardless of their participation in the criminal 
prosecution of their offender.170 Congress should not require victims of child pornography 
to participate in law enforcement efforts in order to receive compensation. Instead, 
Congress should simply require victims to prove that they are a child pornography 
victim and that their images are in or have been in circulation on the Internet. Both 
evidence of a prosecution or investigation of an offender, including police and prosecutor 
records, or verification from NCMEC’s Child Victim Identification program could 
level of harm attributable to one who distributes and possesses child pornography differs 
from the level of harm attributable to one guilty of possessing images of child pornography.
 Id.
165. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006). The statute applies to “[a]ny person, who while a minor, was a victim of a 
violation of section . . . 2252A . . . and who suffers personal injury as a result of such injury.” Id. Section 
2252A is the federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography. Id. § 2252A.
167. Section 2255 originally provided damages for no less than $50,000. However, the text of the statute was 
changed to $150,000 as an amendment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006 “to protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child 
pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child 
crime victims.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 707, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
168. See United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) 
(holding that comparing possession of images to direct abuse or production supports the finding that 
simple receipt causes less than $150,000 in harm).
169. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1196 (“[S]preading of funds required for victims across every offender should 
make the amount paid more proportional to the crime committed, while also preventing excessive order 
amounts on individual defendants.”).
170. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 10603c(3)(A)(i) (West 2008).
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prove an individual’s status as a child pornography victim.171 Further like ITVERP, 
victims will also have to show that they have suffered “emotional injury” as a result.172
 By providing compensation without requiring victims’ law enforcement 
participation, Congress will eliminate the victim-related problems in applying 
restitution to cases of possession. First and foremost, requiring all possessors to pay 
into the fund, regardless of whether a victim is identified or is participating in the 
prosecution, will provide compensation to those victims whose possessors are not yet 
apprehended or convicted.173 This will eliminate the injustices created by the current 
restitution framework when possessors are able to avoid paying restitution because the 
victims cannot be identified in images and when victims are prohibited from petitioning 
for assistance because their possessors have not been apprehended.174 Victims would 
also avoid waiting indefinitely to receive compensation from their offenders and would 
avoid receiving regular notifications reminding them of their victimization. As a result, 
the suggested fund will give life to the victim-centered objectives of restitution.
 Further, victim participation in the investigation or prosecution of a perpetrator 
may cause additional trauma and frustrate the healing process, especially for 
children.175 The current framework requires victims to prove that they were harmed 
by the possessor through victim impact statements, expert evaluations, and testimony, 
which may not only traumatize victims, but may make them feel as though they 
themselves are on trial.176 Instead of slowing the healing process, the new program 
171. See supra note 124.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(3)(A)(i) (2006).
173. Jacques, supra note 18, at 1194–95 (“If courts imposed mandatory fines on all child pornography 
offenders, wrongdoers could not escape the duty Congress created to compensate their victims, and the 
overall amount of resources available to victims should increase.”).
174. See id. at 1194.
175. See Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v. The 
Accused’s Right to Confrontation, 18 Law & Psychol. Rev. 439, 445–46 (1994).
The impact of the emotional distress involved in court testimony can stay with a child 
into adulthood. The child is likely to develop at a slower rate than his or her peers 
because trauma during childhood can delay normal cognitive and emotional 
development. In a comparison of effects of the legal process on child victims who had 
testified in court and others who had not testified, those children who testified were 
shown to have notably greater distress both seven months after testifying and after the 
conclusion of the legal process. Evidence of this increased distress was in the form of 
depression, anxiety, and some psychosomatic symptoms. Due to the interruption in 
childhood development, the negative consequences of involvement in the legal process 
can be more momentous for a child than it would be for an adult.
 Id.
176. See id. at 441–42.
Research indicates that the more interviews a child is subjected to, the more harmful 
the process is to the child. The number of times a child must repeat her story is one of 
the strongest predictors of trauma. Multiple exposures to stressful events can reduce the 
child’s resilience and make the child more susceptible to distress.
 Id.
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will promote a victim’s healing process by validating them and lessening their 
emotional suffering through an non-confrontational and direct compensation process. 
On the other hand, this new compensation program may be subject to criticism for 
failing to provide the benefits of individual retribution as between a victim and his or 
her offender.177 Yet, given the problems with the current framework, the consistency 
and redress created by this program will most likely outweigh retribution.
 A compensation program will also provide additional benefits to victims and the 
criminal justice system and promote the traditional values behind restitution. Providing 
a guaranteed sum of money, rather than a substantial, but potentially uncollectable, 
restitution sum will likely draw greater victim satisfaction than the current framework, 
especially because “victim satisfaction is best achieved when collection rates are high, 
even when increasing compliance comes at the expense of reducing the amount of the 
restitution judgment.”178 Furthermore, shifting away from the criminal system will 
save administrative costs associated with restitution.179 Additionally, possessor’s fines, 
paid into the victim fund, may advance the traditional objectives of restitution, despite 
not providing money directly to an individual victim.180 Requiring possessors to pay a 
fine, in addition to any other prescribed consequence, can act as both a deterrent and a 
punishment while also restoring victims.181
  4. How to Create the Fund
 To start, Congress would first have to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2252A—which is the 
federal statute prohibiting the possession or receipt of child pornography—and 
require a standard fine for those convicted under the statute.182 Congress would also 
need to eliminate the crime of child pornography possession from the list of 
enumerated offenses triggering mandatory restitution under the MVRA.183 After 
these changes, in order to create this new federal compensation program, Congress 
would need to amend VOCA in the same way it did for ITVERP.
 VOCA instituted the Crime Victims Fund184 with the purpose of “financ[ing] 
payments to State and Federal victims compensation and assistance programs.”185 In 
1988, Congress formally established the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) with a 
177. See id. at 440–41 (noting the legal process can be beneficial to victims, but most often when the children 
have additional familial support).
178. Dickman, supra note 20, at 1699.
179. For example, court costs in determining the amount of victims’ losses and paying both prosecutors and 
defense attorneys in restitution proceedings. Id. at 1709.
180. See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Courts have found that restitution 
is not only a means of making a victim whole, but also serves punitive and rehabilitative purposes.”).
181. See Note, supra note 12, at 938 (“Like a fine, restitution can also be an effective deterrent.”).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006).
183. Id. § 2259(a).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006).
185. United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-497, at 4–5 (1984)).
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mission “to enhance the nation’s capacity to assist victims of crime and to provide 
leadership in changing attitudes, policies, and practices to promote justice and healing 
for all victims of crime.”186 Most importantly, OVC’s main role is to administer the 
Crime Victims Fund.187 Additionally, the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million 
from the Crime Victims Fund to support an Anti-Terrorism Emergency Reserve.188 
This reserve provides supplemental funds to state compensation programs for 
emergency relief in the aftermath of acts of terrorism or mass violence.189
 A 2000 VOCA amendment authorized the director of the OVC to establish 
ITVERP, which would “reimburse eligible direct victims of acts of international 
terrorism that occurred outside the United States for expenses associated with that 
victimization.”190 The OVC director was also authorized to use the Anti-Terrorism 
Emergency Reserve to fund ITVERP.191 As stated above, the program placed the 
burden of compensating victims of international terrorism on the federal government.192
 In order to create a new federal compensation system, Congress would need to 
again amend VOCA, this time to authorize the OVC with the power to create and 
oversee the new program193 and carve out funds from the Crime Victims Fund to 
support the new program. However, unlike ITVERP, which is funded through the 
Anti-Terrorism Emergency Reserve, Congress would need to designate a specific 
amount of financial assets from the Crime Victims Fund to support this program.194 
Congress would then set up a separate trust within the Crime Victims Fund to hold all 
convicted possessor fines. Accordingly, Congress would be carving out only the second 
federal program to directly compensate victims outside of emergency situations.195
V. COnCLUsiOn
 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court suggested the most efficient way to 
destroy the child pornography industry would be “to dry up the market for this 
186. Guidelines for the Anti-Terrorism and Emergency Assistance Program for Terrorism and Mass Violence 
Crimes, 67 Fed. Reg. 4822, 4825 (Jan. 31, 2002). Accord 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(c)(1) (2006).
188. Id. § 10601(d)(5)(A).
189. Id. §§ 10601(d)(5)(B), 10603b(b).
190. International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 49518 (proposed Aug. 
24, 2005) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 94) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(b) 
(2006).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 10603c(b) (2006).
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material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or 
otherwise promoting the product.”196 Unfortunately, the sheer scope of this business 
and its use of advanced technology decrease the likelihood that the market will dry 
up anytime soon.197 Therefore, alongside continued law enforcement efforts, we must 
adequately redress the harms caused by this heinous crime. This includes remedying 
the detrimental effects of mere possession on victims and ensuring that victims are 
made whole.
 As this note has explained, the current approach to restitution is not a suitable 
solution for the crime of possession. While restitution is supposed to both restore a 
victim and punish a defendant, neither objective is met in cases of possession. 
Further, restitution as applied to possession creates inconsistencies and risks violating 
the Eighth Amendment. Shifting to a victim compensation program would alleviate 
these problems and properly address the “seemingly unworkable criminal restitution” 
framework.198 Furthermore, modeling the program after ITVERP, with appropriate 
modifications, would provide additional advantages. For instance, victims would 
avoid the inconsistencies created by state programs and obtain compensation 
regardless of their participation in the prosecution of their offenders. This new 
program is the proper remedy for the crime of possession and, more importantly, 
provides the most competent framework to compensate victims for the “slow acid 
drip” of trauma caused by the mere possession of child pornography.199
196. 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
197. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209, 234 (2001).
New technologies have changed the methods of distribution and production. Though 
new laws proliferate to combat the new technology . . . , law enforcement officials still 
expect that child pornography is going to rapidly explode as a cottage industry. Despite 
all our efforts, we are now in the golden age of child pornography.
 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 793 n.12 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
199. See United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
